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REWRITING JUDICIAL RECUSAL RULES WITH BIG DATA
Raymond J. McKoski*
Abstract
Big data affects the personal and professional life of every judge. A
judge’s travel time to work, creditworthiness, and chances of an IRS audit
all depend on predictive algorithms interpreting big data. A client’s choice
of counsel, the precise wording of a litigant’s motion, and the composition
of the jury may be dictated by analytics. Touted as a means of bringing
objectivity to judicial decision-making, judges have employed big data to
determine sentences and to set the amount of restitution in class action
cases. Unfortunately, the legal profession and big data proponents have
ignored one perplexing problem begging for a big data solution—the
arbitrary and inconsistent manner in which courts determine judicial
recusal issues.
Every jurisdiction disqualifies a judge when the fully-informed,
reasonable, lay observer concludes that the judge’s “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” Created by the American Bar Association in
1972 to bring uniformity and consistency to the disqualification process,
this “objective” test has been a dismal failure. The ABA’s goal, however,
can be realized by infusing data analytics into the disqualification
decision-making process.
Part I of this Article identifies the serious shortcomings of an
appearance-based disqualification standard. Part II explains how
analysis of big data can correct the theoretical and practical problems
plaguing the “might reasonably be questioned” standard. Part III applies
the big data derived model to one type of disqualification motion—motions
seeking a judge’s removal from a case because of contributions made to
the judge’s election campaign by litigants, lawyers, or others connected
with the litigation.
INTRODUCTION
Big data influences the personal and professional life of every judge.1 As like
any other person, a judge may benefit from medical technology’s use of big data to
*
© 2020 Raymond J. McKoski. Circuit Judge (retired), Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois. Judge McKoski is an Adjunct Professor at the UIC John Marshall Law
School, Chicago, Illinois.
1
See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use
of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 10 (2018) (“Big Data is not a futuristic phenomenon.
It is already in widespread use, pervading all aspects of our daily lives.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

383

384

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

create a patient-specific vaccine for the judge or a member of the judge’s family.2
The judge’s creditworthiness,3 travel time to work,4 and the likelihood of an Internal
Revenue Service audit5 depend on predictive algorithms interpreting big data. Big
data enhances a judge’s enjoyment of sporting events because analytics is
“revolutionizing” all major sports “from player recruitment to fan engagement.”6 If
a judge cannot find one of the 15,000 broadcast radio stations in the United States
to her liking,7 data analysis allows the judge “to have [her] own, personal radio
stations.”8
In the exercise of adjudicative responsibilities, a judge knows that law
enforcement departments rely on technology to predict where crimes will occur and
to identify likely victims and perpetrators.9 Soon, big data may establish reasonable
suspicion to support the temporary detention of a suspect under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1968 ruling in Terry v. Ohio.10
2

See Chloé Margulis, The Application of Big Data Analytics to Patent Litigation, 99 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 305, 317–18 (2017).
3
See Komal S. Patel, Note, Testing the Limits of the First Amendment: How Online
Civil Rights Testing Is Protected Speech Activity, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1481 (2018).
4
See Andrew Kasabian, Note, Litigating in the 21st Century: Amending Challenges for
Cause in Light of Big Data, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 173, 191 (2015) (“A final industry where Big
Data has made an impact is traffic management and control.”).
5
See Kimberly A. Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS:
What Tax Practitioners Need to Know, 128 J. TAX’N 6, 6 (2018).
6
Ryan Ayers, How Big Data Is Revolutionizing Sports, DATACONOMY (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://dataconomy.com/2018/01/big-data-revolutionizing-favorite-sports-teams [https://
perma.cc/P7B8-MY6Q]; see also Brian Burke, 4th Down Study, ADVANCED FOOTBALL
ANALYTICS, (Nov. 12, 2004), http://www.advancedfootballanalytics.com/index.php/home/
research/game-strategy/120-4th-down-study [https://perma.cc/LH9H-67ZZ] (using big data
to analyze decisions made on fourth downs); Bernard Marr, The Big Risks of Big Data in
Sports, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/04/28/thebig-risks-of-big-data-in-sports/#6926d6757c6f [https://perma.cc/7UGQ-Q8LF] (discussing
pitfalls of big data’s use in sports).
7
See FCC, BROADCAST STATION TOTALS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2018 (FCC News, Oct.
3, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-354386A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4
AS-L5JQ].
8
How Does Big Data Impact Your Life?, BOTANANALYTICS BLOG (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://botanalytics.co/blog/2017/08/04/big-data-impact-life/
[https://perma.cc/QXC8ZPNT].
9
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1109, 1113 (2017) (“Data from past crimes, including crime types and locations, are fed into
a computer algorithm to identify targeted city blocks with a daily (and sometimes hourly)
forecast of crime. . . . In large cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and New Orleans,
complex social network analysis has isolated likely perpetrators and victims of gun
violence.”).
10
392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits brief
investigative detentions by law enforcement officers who possess “specific and articulable
facts” short of probable cause, that create a likelihood “that criminal activity may be afoot”);
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But law enforcement’s use of big data and algorithms to bring alleged offenders
into court is only one way in which predictive analytics will affect the administration
of justice. Prosecutors already present adjudicators with the results of
algorithmically generated recidivism predictions as an aid in bail, parole, and
sentencing decisions.11 Litigants may choose their lawyers through dataset analysis
that compares overall lawyer success rates, lawyer success rates before individual
judges, and even lawyer success rates before individual judges in specific types of
litigation.12 Big data can dictate case processing and outcomes by providing clients
with the “universe of options others have taken in similar situations and to forecast
the probability that a particular course of action would be favorable to the client.”13
The vast amount of personalized electronic information makes jury selection ripe
for predictive software. 14 And courts have employed algorithms to set restitution
amounts in class action cases. 15
see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1989) (comparing Terry’s “reasonable
suspicion” standard with the probable cause standard); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 386 (2015) (describing how
“big data tools exist to generate the necessary reasonable suspicion” required by Terry v.
Ohio).
11
See MEGAN T. STEVENSON & JENNIFER L. DOLEAC, THE ROADBLOCK TO REFORM 1,
3 (Am. Const. Soc’y, Nov. 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/
RoadblockToReformReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5JG-WU6U] (stating that algorithmic
risk assessment tools are used at sentencing in “at least twenty-eight full states; at least seven
additional states have at least one county that uses risk assessment tools at sentencing”); see
also Ferguson, supra note 9, at 1120–21) (discussing the use of actuarial predictions in bail,
sentencing, and parole decisions); Ric Simmons, Big Data and Procedural Justice:
Legitimizing Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573
(2018) (discussing debate over the use of big data in pre-arrest monitoring, bail, and
sentencing); Jason Tashea, Risk-assessment algorithms challenged in bail, sentencing and
parole decisions, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_camp
aign=weekly_email [https://perma.cc/NPM7-H47T] (describing the debate over “the use of
algorithms in bail, sentencing and parole decisions”).
12
See Kasabian, supra note 4, at 206 (stating that data analytics can “help clients
identify the attorneys that win before certain judges on certain types of cases.”); Margulis,
supra note 2, at 318 (“Big data is currently implemented to compare competing law firms”
and to “predict[] and compare[] lawyer success rates.”).
13
Caryn Devins et al., The Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 357,
367 (2017).
14
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935, 937
(2016) (“The rise of ‘big data’ has the potential to upend the current informational limitations
of jury selection.”); see also VOLTAIRE, TOUR, https://voltaireapp.com/tour
[https://perma.cc/S5V7-V8LD] (last visited Sept. 17, 2019) (offering to combine “powerful
artificial intelligence,” patent pending algorithms, and access to more than a billion data
points to identify “hidden risks and potential biases” of jurors).
15
See, e.g., Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir.
2015) (noting that algorithms may also be used to calculate restitution).
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The explosion of scholarly work and proliferation of private and publicly
sponsored research into the use of big data in the administration of justice has
ignored one problem that begs for a big data solution—the “crumbling” framework
of judicial disqualification.16 Of course, some disqualification decisions are easy.
For example, the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct
requires a judge’s disqualification in any matter in which the judge’s relative within
the third degree of relationship appears as a lawyer, witness, or litigant.17 Judges
effortlessly comply with such specific disqualification standards because they know
their relatives. But in addition to a list of specific disqualifying factors, every
jurisdiction requires disqualification “in any proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”18 This catch-all standard is one of the
most frequently invoked provisions of judicial codes and the primary
disqualification standard.19 Because the “might reasonably be questioned” standard
is “troublesomely vague,”20 “frighteningly empty of content,”21 and “unworkable,”22
the standard has failed to accomplish its drafters’ objectives. It has not brought

16

Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again, 30 REV. LITIG.
671, 675 (2011) (“I argue that the dominant regime that has structured judicial
disqualification in the state and federal courts for nearly forty years . . . is crumbling, and the
struggle for a successor regime has begun.”).
17
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); see also id. at
Terminology (defining “Third degree of relationship” to include “the following persons:
great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, greatgrandchild, nephew, and niece.”).
18
Id. at r. 2.11(A); see also Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their
Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ.
L. REV. 411, 416 n.29 (2014) (explaining that every jurisdiction has adopted this standard).
19
See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000)
(describing the “might reasonably be questioned” test as “[o]ne of the most frequently
invoked standards in the [judicial] Codes”); Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of
Lawyer Disqualification, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71, 155 n.356 (2014) (describing the
“might reasonably be questioned” test as “[t]he primary disqualification standard for
judges”).
20
John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 59-60 (1970); see also Leslie W. Abramson, What Every Judge Should
Know About the Appearance of Impartiality, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2016) (“[T]he
ABA’s 1972 general principle for judicial disqualification endures despite its intrinsic
vagueness.”).
21
Judicial Disqualification: Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 39 (1971,
1973) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John P. Frank).
22
Haynes v. State, 937 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); see also Burgess v.
State, 342 S.W.3d 325, 328 n.5 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (“The Court in Haynes found the ‘might
reasonably be questioned’ standard unworkable. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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consistency and uniformity to recusal decisions,23 made recusal decisions objective
rather than subjective, or increased public confidence in the judiciary.24
Many shortcomings infect the catch-all category of recusal. First, the drafters
of the “might reasonably be questioned” language provided judges with little help
in interpreting or applying the elusive test.25 Second, rather than filling that void,
courts have specifically advised judges not to rely on case precedent when deciding
whether to remove themselves from cases.26 Third, judicial ethics advisory
committees—created to assist judges in complying with ethical mandates—have
largely abdicated on the issue.27 Fourth, the test pretends to be an “objective test”
because the ordinary, reasonable, lay observer, and not the judge, is assigned to
decide whether a set of circumstances creates an appearance of partiality.28 It is no
coincidence, however, that the lay arbiter of judicial disqualification is imbued with
precisely the same knowledge as the challenged judge. That knowledge includes
facts unknown to the general public, all facets of substantive and procedural law, the
judge’s past judicial performance, the practicalities and realities of practicing law,
and a complete mastery of the code of judicial conduct.29 The level of imputed
knowledge attributed to the reasonable person raises the suspicion that the fictitious
arbiter is, in reality, the challenged judge. This suspicion is confirmed by the fact
that challenged judges usually decide their own disqualification motions, thus
simultaneously serving as the interpreter and object of the “might reasonably be
questioned” standard. The result is an objective test in theory and a subjective test
in practice.30
These and other failings have led researchers to conclude that “judicial
disqualification frequently is subjective, random, and arbitrary” and that the
appearance of partiality test in particular “pose[s] a special dilemma.”31 Professor
Charles Geyh put it this way: “The net effect is that except in extreme or well-settled
cases, consensus on when it is fair or reasonable to doubt the impartiality of a judge
is elusive—we do not know it when we see it.”32

23
This Article uses the terms “recusal” and “disqualification” interchangeably. Cf. In
re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 769 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that courts
commonly use the terms “recusal” and “disqualification” interchangeably).
24
See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
25
See McKoski, supra note 18, at 434–38.
26
See infra Section I.B.1.
27
Id.
28
See infra Section I.B.2.
29
See infra Section I.B.2.a.
30
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES § 5.1 (2d ed. 2007).
31
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 4–5 (Am. Judicature Soc’y,
1995).
32
Geyh, supra note 16, at 676.
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Further signaling the profession’s disappointment with the “might reasonably
be questioned” standard, the literature is replete with suggested reforms to improve
the objectivity and consistency of disqualification decisions.33 The recommended
modifications include directing that independent judges hear recusal motions,
requiring judges to provide written disqualification decisions, the preemptory
disqualification of trial judges, and the use of lay panels to decide recusal issues.34
Even if states were anxious to adopt such reforms, the reforms do not address the
fundamental theoretical flaw in the appearance-based disqualification regime. The
“reasonable observer” as presently constructed is simply “hopelessly outmoded.”35
This Article proposes that permitting big data36 to control, or at least inform,
disqualification decisions will significantly reduce the theoretical and practical
deficiencies of appearance-based recusal. By removing the judge from the equation
and enhancing the objective information possessed by the fictitious reasonable
person, the ultimate goal of uniform, consistent, and predictable disqualification
decisions can be achieved. Part I examines the undeniable defects of appearancebased disqualification. Part I also briefly reviews recurring recommendations for
reforming the judicial disqualification process. Part II describes how the use of big
data would transform the “might reasonably be questioned” test into what its
architects intended. Part III illustrates how big data can cure shortcomings in
appearance-based disqualification by applying the big data model to one type of
disqualification motion—motions seeking a judge’s removal from a case based on
contributions made to the judge’s election campaign by litigants, lawyers, or others
connected with the litigation. The devastating impact that campaign contributions
can have on the perceived fairness of the judiciary and the sheer volume of untapped,
33

See infra Section I.C.
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial
Disqualification—And a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better
Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30
REV. LITIG. 733, 788–805 (2011) (collecting suggested reforms).
35
Id. at 809.
36
Some commentators might describe the proposal outlined in this Article as
employing “analytics” rather than “big data” because the relevant data sets may not satisfy
the “volume, velocity, and variety” requirement usually associated with big data. See Jason
Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2017). And in some
applications of the proposal, the “three Vs” might not meet the evolving and “squishy”
definitions of big data. See Paul Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 339, 340 (2013). But today, the term “‘big data’ has become nearly synonymous
with ‘data analysis,’” id., and is used here to describe “a way of thinking about knowledge
through data and a framework for supporting decision making. . . .” Sofia Grafanaki,
Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 803, 805 (2017) (quoting Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run
Around Anonymity and Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD:
FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 44, 46 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014)); see also Michael
Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 539 (2014) (“The term, ‘big data,’
refers to a new method of empirical inquiry.”).
34
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public information relevant to whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned because of financial assistance provided to a judge’s election effort,
make this issue the perfect test for big data’s ability to correct the defects in
appearance-based disqualification.
I. APPEARANCE-BASED JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: ORIGINS AND FAILED
REFORM EFFORTS
In 1972, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a new judicial
disqualification regime mandating disqualification whenever the lay observer might
reasonably question a judge’s impartiality.37 Suffering from serious deficiencies in
a theoretical framework and practical application, this ambiguous disqualification
test never had a chance to succeed. Patch-work attempts to revise the standard have
failed to address the inherent flaws in appearance-based recusal.
A. The ABA’s Transition to Appearance-Based Disqualification
Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, the legal profession embraced
the long-standing value of actual judicial impartiality as the cornerstone of the
American legal system.38 The common law presumed that every judge possessed
this “indispensable feature of democracy.”39 This presumption was irrebuttable, save
for matters in which a judge had a direct financial interest.40 The common law
considered “the lure of lucre” such a “particularly strong motivation,”41 that any
pecuniary interest in a proceeding, no matter how small, automatically disqualified
37

CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972), reprinted in LISA L.
MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 116 (1992).
38
See McKoski, supra note 18, at 418. (“But the ‘big bang’ in the expanding universe
of judicial disqualification came in 1972, when the ABA decided that promoting public
confidence in judicial impartiality, rather than protecting a litigant’s right to a fair judge,
supplied the primary rationale for disqualifying judges.”).
39
Elizabeth B. Wydra, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
Caperton: Placing the Federalism Debate in Historical Context, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 239,
241 (2010) (“[A] fair and impartial judiciary has been an indispensable feature of
democracy.”).
40
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 191, 250 (2012) (“[A]t common law, the presumption of impartiality was
irrebuttable: judges could not be disqualified for bias.”); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877–79 (2009) (holding that financial interest is sufficient to require
recusal).
41
Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs?
Should Judicial Education be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 947 (2002) (“As the common law recognized, and as experience
teaches, the lure of lucre is a particularly strong motivation, and therefore judges ought to be
prohibited from presiding over cases in whose outcomes they have a direct financial
interest.”).
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the judge.42 The common law recognized no other interest as sufficient to overcome
a judge’s oath to administer justice impartially.43 In the United States, disqualifying
factors slowly expanded to include interests other than financial. In 1821, Congress
amended the federal recusal statute to remove a judge from a case in which the
judge’s relative was a party.44 In 1911, Congress further amended the statute to
require recusal when a judge possessed a “personal bias or prejudice” in a matter.45
During this expansion of the grounds for judicial disqualification, one fact remained
constant—the determinative issue was a judge’s actual impartiality.46 Frequently,
courts and commentators also advised against creating an appearance of bias,
partiality, or evil, but these admonishments were hortatory and directed to all
participants in the justice system including lawyers, judges, jurors, witnesses, and
even law professors.47
42

Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 340 (1 Tyng) (1816), stated the rule:

It is very certain, that, by the principles of natural justice, of the common law, and
of our constitution, no man can lawfully sit as judge in a cause in which he may
have a pecuniary interest. Nor does it make any difference, that the interest
appears to be trifling: for the minds of men are so differently affected by the same
degrees of interest that it has been found impossible to draw a satisfactory line.
Any interest, therefore, however small, has been held sufficient to render a judge
incompetent.
(emphasis in original).
43
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1936) (“As Blackstone put it,
‘the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and
idea.’” (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361)).
44
Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; see also Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N.Y. 547,
551 (1850) (“Hence the statute declares, that no judge of any court can sit as such in any
cause to which he is a party or in which he is interested, or in which he would be disqualified
from being a juror by reason of consanguinity or affinity to either of the parties.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
45
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090.
46
See Kevin D. Swan, Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the Face
of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (1987) (stating that
“actual impartiality” governed a federal judge’s recusal until 1972 when Congress adopted
the ABA’s new appearance-based, “might reasonably be questioned” test).
47
E.g., Ayrhart v. Wilhelmy, 112 N.W. 782, 783 (Iowa 1907) (“[Jurors] should be
careful not only to avoid actual impropriety, but to keep themselves clear of the very
appearance of evil. . . .”); In re Duncan, 42 S.E. 433, 441 (S.C. 1902) (“And we hope that
Mr. Duncan’s unenviable experience in this proceeding will prove a warning, especially to
the young members of the bar, so to acquit themselves as attorneys at law as to avoid even
the appearance of evil.”); Paul W. Brosman, The Association Law School and Bar
Examination Preparation, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 412, 414–15 (1930–1934) (suggesting that
law professors avoid the appearance of evil); R. Ogden Doremus, Duties of Experts and
Others in Poison Cases, 1 CRIM. L. MAG. 293, 320 (1880) (instructing expert witnesses how
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Canon 4 of the first model judicial code adopted by the ABA in 1924 instructed
judges to aspire to keep their in-court conduct “free from impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety” and their personal lives, “beyond reproach.”48 Canon 4,
however, did not govern disqualification. That task was assigned to Canons 13 and
29.49 Canon 13 disqualified a judge when a near relative appeared as a litigant.50
Canon 29 required recusal when a judge’s direct “personal interests,” usually
interpreted to mean financial interests, were involved.51 Consistent with the law at
the time, no Canon dictated or even suggested recusal for the sake of appearances.
That would change with the ABA’s 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct.52
The 1972 ABA Code continued to list several circumstances that required the
automatic disqualification of a judge. Those disqualifying factors included financial
interests, relationships with lawyers and litigants, prior service as a lawyer in a case,
actual bias or prejudice, and personal knowledge of controverted adjudicative
facts.53 But the 1972 ABA Code added a standalone ground for recusal that relied
on perceptions rather than reality. Canon 3(C)(1) mandated disqualification
whenever a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”54 Several
important considerations convalesced to convince the drafters of the 1972 Code to
adopt an appearance-based disqualification regime.
First, while the traditional fact-based disqualifying factors like financial and
family interests were sufficient to protect the litigants’ constitutional due process
right to an impartial arbiter,55 these disqualifiers did not do enough to enhance public
confidence in the judiciary.56 To fill that void, the ABA enacted a broad, appearancebased recusal test that focused on how things looked to the public rather than on the
parties’ substantive right to a fair and impartial trial and judge. A trial might be fair
to avoid the appearance of evil); Office Duties, 4 AM. L. REG. 193, 200 (1856) (“A lawyer’s
honor, like a woman’s, must be above all suspicion. He, as well as she, must avoid the very
appearance of evil.”).
48
CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924).
49
Id. at Canons 13, 29.
50
Id. at Canon 13.
51
Id. at Canon 29.
52
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972).
53
Id. at Canon 3(C)(1)(a)–(d).
54
Id. at Canon 3(C)(1).
55
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution require “due process
of law” before the government may deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. U.S. CONST.
amend V, amend. XIV. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as requiring an
impartial decisionmaker. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
56
See Raymond J. McKoski, Giving Up Appearances: Judicial Disqualification and
the Apprehension of Bias, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 35, 63 (2015) [hereinafter McKoski,
Giving Up Appearances] (“[R]ules mandating a judge’s removal for an appearance of bias
do not protect the parties but instead serve to promote public confidence in judicial
impartiality. When a judge possessing an actual bias hears a case, the litigants sustain the
injury. But when a judge suffers from only an appearance of bias the injury is not to the
parties but to the judicial system.”).
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in actuality, thereby protecting the parties, but look unfair, thereby damaging public
trust in the courts. Second, proving actual judicial bias was nearly impossible.57
Third, the devastating effect of the Watergate scandal58 on public confidence in
governmental institutions triggered attempts to shore-up faith in the judiciary.59 How
better to enhance public trust in the judiciary than to disqualify judges when the
public has “any scintilla of doubt” about a judge’s impartiality.60 Fourth, the legal
profession was dissatisfied with the subjective test that judges applied in
determining whether disqualification was necessary.61 For example, prior to its
amendment in 1974, the federal disqualification statute required recusal when a
judge was “so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein.”62 The subjective standard left disqualification matters “basically committed
to the judge’s conscience.”63
57

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (noting the difficulty
in proving actual bias); Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 345 (Tenn. 2011) (observing that as
a practical matter subjective bias or lack of impartiality may be impossible to prove).
58
The “Watergate” scandal refers to the events triggered by the arrest of five persons
attempting to “bug” the Democrat National Committee headquarters in the Watergate Hotel
in Washington, D.C., for the purpose of giving the Republicans inside information in
planning election strategy in the 1972 presidential campaign. The break-in to the Watergate,
the connection between the burglary and President Richard Nixon’s reelection campaign, a
Supreme Court decision ordering the release of recordings made by President Nixon in the
Oval Office, and resolutions of impeachment voted by the House Judiciary Committee, led
to President Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. See HERBERT S. PARMET, RICHARD NIXON
AND HIS AMERICA 637–38 (1990).
59
See James J. Alfini et al., Dealing with Judicial Misconduct in the States: Judicial
Independence, Accountability and Reform, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 889, 908 (2007) (concluding
that most states adopted the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct “in the wake of the
Watergate scandal, a time when the press and the public were demanding greater
accountability from public officials.”).
60
Hearings, supra note 21, at 14 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining why the
federal judicial disqualification statute should be amended to require recusal when the
circumstances create an appearance of partiality).
61
See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 872 (1988)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that when Congress amended the federal
disqualification statute in 1974, it “was concerned with the ‘appearance’ of impropriety, and
to that end changed the previous subjective standard for disqualification to an objective one;
no longer was disqualification to be decided on the basis of the opinion of the judge in
question, but by the standard of what a reasonable person would think.”).
62
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948) (emphasis added).
63
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1976); MacNeil Bros. Co. v.
Cohen, 264 F.2d 186, 189 (1st Cir. 1959) (“[W]hether a member of a court of appeals should
disqualify himself . . . is a matter confided to the conscience of the particular judge.”); see
also Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[D]isqualification for being ‘so
related or connected’ is generally ‘a matter confided to the conscience of the particular
judge.’”) (quoting MacNeil Bros. at 189); Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d
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Convinced that an objective test would make disqualification decisions less
capricious and arbitrary and so increase public confidence in the judiciary, the ABA
added the appearance-based test to the 1972 Code.64 The new test, apparently
derived from Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Continental Casualty,65
stated, “[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”66 The 1990 and 2007 ABA Model Codes67
included the “might reasonably be questioned” test and it has been adopted by every
state and federal jurisdiction.68
But, as the next section details, the objective disqualification standard adopted
by the 1972 ABA Code suffers from theoretical and practical problems at least as
significant as the subjective test it replaced. Big data can help eliminate these
shortcomings, as discussed in Part II.
B. Surveying the Inadequacies of Appearance-Based Disqualification
Vagueness impedes any attempt to apply an appearance-based recusal test.
Courts and administrative bodies readily admit their inability to cabin the “might
reasonably be questioned” standard or guide judges in interpreting and applying the
test.69 Compounding the vagueness problem, an “objective” inquiry requires the
reasonable layperson to assess whether the circumstances warrant a belief that a
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. That ordinary observer, the
average person on the street, is presumed to know all the facts and law in the case,
including everything the judge knows, and in some cases, facts unknown to the
judge.70 And while the reasonable, detached observer must be someone outside the
judiciary, it is the challenged judge who takes off his robe to examine the issue and
then puts the robe back on to announce the lay observer’s decision.71

903, 907 (7th Cir. 1959) (observing that recusal is an issue “to be determined by the judge
within his own conscience”).
64
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972).
65
393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (“[A]ny tribunal permitted by law to try cases and
controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.”).
66
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972); see also E. WAYNE
THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 61 (1973).
67
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990); MODEL
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
68
See McKoski, supra note 18, at 416 n.29.
69
See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
70
See infra Section I.B.2.a.
71
See infra Section I.B.2.b.

394

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

1. A Hopelessly Vague Standard
Courts, commentators, and judicial advisory bodies agree that the catch-all
disqualification standard is “troublesomely vague” and “elusive” in application.72
Nevertheless, the 1972 Code did not attempt to define the standard or set parameters
to foster its consistent application.73 This omission is curious because the drafters of
the 1972 Code were critical of the indefinite disqualification provisions of the 1924
Canons. The drafting committee for the 1972 Code found the old Canon 13’s
command to disqualify in cases involving near relatives and Canon 29’s requirement
to disqualify from cases involving a judge’s personal interests “far from satisfactory
. . . for their lack of guidance in a specific situation.”74 The drafters’ failure to define
or refine the new standard in the 1972 Code appears to have resulted from their belief
that most recusal questions would fall within the four specific conflict-based
disqualifying circumstances included in Canon 3C(1).75 In fact, Professor Thode
worried that lawyers and judges would “overlook” the general catch-all standard.76
The lack of importance attached to the new test was also reflected in Thode’s failure
to mention the “might reasonably be questioned” language in his list of “highlights
of the new [1972] ABA Code.”77 The ABA drafting committee did, however, make
two things very clear. First, the 1972 Code adopted an appearance-based
disqualification regime by requiring recusal whenever the circumstances created an
“appearance of bias,” “appearance of impropriety,” or the “appearance of a lack of
impartiality.”78 Second, the new test was “objective” because the fully-informed,
reasonable person, not the judge, would determine if the challenged judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.79
Reviewing courts concede that their decisions do not help judges struggling
over whether disqualification is necessary for a particular matter. In stark
72

Frank, supra note 20, at 59–60 (“troublesomely vague”); Foster v. United States, 618
A.2d 191, 195 (D.C. 1992) (Reilly, J., dissenting) (describing the standard as “somewhat
elusive”).
73
See MILORD, supra note 37, at 116–17; see also SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557
F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977) (observing that “no factual or concrete examples of the
appearance of impartiality were provided in the Congressional debates” concerning the
adoption of this standard).
74
THODE, supra note 66, at 60, 63 (“[O]ld canon 29 prescribes a disqualification for
‘personal interest,’ but gives no help to a judge in defining which interests are
disqualifying.”).
75
Id. at 60.
76
Id.
77
E. Wayne Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 793, 797–803 (1972). Similarly, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., in his 1971 article
summarizing the ongoing work of the ABA committee, failed to mention the appearancebased standard while discussing conflict-based disqualification rules. Robert A. Ainsworth,
Judicial Ethics—A Crisis Abates, 45 TULANE L. REV. 245, 257–58 (1971).
78
THODE, supra note 66, at 60–61.
79
Id. at 60.
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admissions, courts advise judges of the futility of consulting disqualification
jurisprudence when deciding whether to remain on a case. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, for instance, advises judges that because recusal decisions turn on
factual subtleties, “the analysis of a particular [disqualification issue] must be
guided, not by comparison to similar situations addressed by prior jurisprudence, but
rather by an independent examination of the unique facts and circumstances of the
particular claim at issue.”80 And while disappointing, the failure of courts to provide
guidance on disqualification issues is understandable because no circumstance is
immune from a claim of apparent partiality. For example, Comment 4 to Rule 2.11
of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge is not
disqualified because a lawyer appearing before the judge is a member of a firm that
employs a relative of the judge.81 But Comment 4 hastens to add that recusal is
necessary if the appearance of the member of the relative’s firm might cause the
judge’s impartiality to be reasonably questioned.82 Just as unhelpful, under Rule
2.11, a judge who previously served as a lawyer for a governmental agency is
disqualified from cases involving the agency only if the judge “personally and
substantially” participated in the case — unless, of course, a lesser degree of
involvement creates an appearance of impropriety.83
Judicial ethics advisory committees have also failed to help judges interpret and
apply the “might reasonably be questioned” disqualification test. For example, the
New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics provided no guidance when it
tried to establish a rule governing a judge’s disqualification due to a personal or
social relationship with an attorney appearing before the judge. The New York
Advisory Committee declared the black letter rule that mere acquaintanceships
between lawyers and judges do not require recusal, unless, of course, an
acquaintanceship creates an appearance of impropriety.84 In other words, an
acquaintanceship does not require disqualification unless the facts could reasonably
cause the reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. This circular
reasoning does not help judges. The ethics advisory committee for federal judges
fared no better than the New York Committee when it advised a judge considering

80

United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Swallers, 897 F.3d
875, 877 (7th Cir. 2018); In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 895 (11th Cir. 2014); Nicholas v. Alley,
71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995); State v. Shelton, 901 N.W.2d 741, 745–46 (S.D. 2017);
Griffen v. Dan Kemp, No. 4:17CV00639 JM, 2018 WL 387810, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 11,
2018).
81
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
82
Id.
83
Id. r. 2.11A(6)(b).
84
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 11-125 (2011).
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whether to recuse from a case in which the godfather of the judge’s child appeared,
that “ultimately, the question of disqualification is one that only the judge may
answer.”85
2. The Ordinary Reasonable Person
Vagueness is not the only problematic aspect of the phrase, “might reasonably
be questioned.” To be considered an “objective” test, a layperson, not a judge, must
determine whether a judge should be removed from a case. In the United States, this
ubiquitous, hypothetical observer is the “average person on the street.”86 Relying on
the disinterested lay observer brings the public into the courtroom87 to apply
accepted societal norms in many areas of public and private jurisprudence.88
Unquestionably, the reasonable person has faithfully fulfilled their duty—at least
where a societal consensus exists—about the applicable standard. Thus, for instance,
the reasonable person easily concludes that the driver of an automobile violates
society’s accepted standard by proceeding through a red light. Similarly, a court
examining a contract may safely conclude, “a reasonable person would agree that a
potential income loss of $584,000 a year is an important economic interest,”89 and
85

U.S. Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Formal Op. 11 (2009); see also Fla. Jud. Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 98-29 (1998) (advising a judge that the disqualification decision
“would be up to the individual judge to decide whether recusal would be necessary”).
86
United States v. Robinson, 809 F.3d 991, 998 (8th Cir. 2016); Potashnick v. Port City
Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] judge faced with a potential ground
for disqualification ought to consider how his participation in a given case looks to the
average person on the street.”); Woods v. United States, No. 1:17CV00047 SNLJ, 2018 WL
4333565, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 11, 2018) (citing Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648 (8th
Cir. 2002) (“The operative issue is whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned by the average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of a case.”));
see also Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative
Perceptive, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2010) (“[L]ooking at the reasonable
person across his many appearances makes at least one thing clear—he is most often the
common or ordinary man.”).
87
McKoski, Giving Up Appearances, supra note 56, at 53 (“The whole idea of
employing the reasonable person standard in judicial ethics is to “bring the public into the
room.” (quoting Lori Ann Foertsch, Scalia’s Duck Hunt Leads to Ruffled Feathers: How the
U.S. Supreme Court and Other Federal Judiciaries Should Change Their Recusal Approach,
43 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 466 (2006))).
88
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that
the reasonable man determines negligence by employing “a standard of conduct demanded
by the community”); Ashley M. Votruba, Will the Real Reasonable Person Please Stand
Up? Using Psychology to Better Understand How Juries Interpret and Apply the Reasonable
Person Standard, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 703, 707 (2013) (“[T]he Reasonable Person Standard has
had an invasive presence throughout much of American jurisprudence including
administrative law, constitutional law, contract law, criminal law, and . . . tort law.”).
89
Kofi Kessey, MD/PHD, Inc. v. Los Robles Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. B279550, 2018 WL
459357, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018).
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that a “reasonable person whose water supply has been contaminated by toxic wastes
is likely to suffer serious emotional distress arising out of fear for his or her own
health.”90 In each situation, neither personal philosophy nor partisan interests affect
the theoretical reasonable person’s deliberative process. The assessment of
negligence or contract interpretation is the same regardless of whether the ordinary
observer is a Republican, Democrat, Conservative, Liberal, Climate Change believer
or Climate Change denier. The same cannot be said for many questions concerning
whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Would the
reasonable person question Justice Clarence Thomas’s impartiality in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act) case because Justice
Thomas’s wife lobbied against the Act? The answer is unequivocally “yes,” if the
reasonable person is a Democrat.91 The answer is “absolutely not” if the observer is
a Republican. How does the reasonable observer view Justice Elena Kagan’s
involvement with the Affordable Care Act while serving as the President’s Solicitor
General? Republicans saw an appearance of impropriety; Democrats did not.92
Unlike assessing fault in negligence cases or interpreting the terms of a
contract, “the question of whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned lies in the eye of the beholder and is often influenced by partisan, biased,
and selfish interests.”93
(a) The Reasonable Person Is Fully Informed
Contrary to the theory underlying appearance-based disqualification, the
reasonable person standard, as constructed by the courts, does not bring the public
into the courtroom. This is because the comprehensive factual and legal knowledge
attributed to the arbiter of recusal issues far exceeds that of the average person and,

90

Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 834 (Cal. 1993) (George, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
91
“Seventy-four House Democrats sent a letter to Justice Thomas suggesting that he
disqualify himself from the health care litigation because his wife’s role in lobbying against
the legislation created ‘the appearance of a conflict of interest.’” Raymond J. McKoski, The
Overarching Legal Fiction: Justice Must Satisfy the Appearance of Justice, 4 SAVANNAH L.
REV. 51, 61–62 (2017) (citing Felicia Sonmez, House Democrats Say Justice Thomas Should
Recuse Himself in Health-Care Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2011), http://voices.washington
post.com/44/2011/02/house-democrats-say-justice-th.html [https://perma.cc/GV9V-G2NL].
92
Conservatives filed an amicus brief seeking Justice Kagan’s recusal from the
Affordable Care Act case because her involvement with the health care legislation while
President Obama’s Solicitor General allegedly created a reasonable question as to her
impartiality. Brief of Amicus Curiae Freedom Watch in Support of Neither Party and on
Issue of Recusal or Disqualification of Justice Elena Kagan at 6–7, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2012 WL 72452.
93
McKoski, supra note 18, at 452.
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for that matter, far surpasses that of any mortal.94 Courts assume that the reasonable
person possesses an in-depth understanding of the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice. For example, courts engraft onto the ordinary observer a
mastery of substantive and procedural law, including the proper method of
calculating a “lodestar,”95 as well as mastery of the code of judicial conduct.96 The
“facts of life” surrounding the judiciary97 and the practice of law98 together with the
court procedures implemented by the challenged judge99 are implanted in the
disinterested observer’s brain. The reasonable person is also assumed to be well
versed in the court record and draws appropriate inferences from statements in the
transcripts.100 Of course, the reasonable person understands and appreciates the role
politics plays in elected and appointed judiciaries.101

94

See, e.g., Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Bias and the Informed Observer: A Call for a
Return to Gough, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 388, 395 (2009) (comparing the reasonable person of
judicial ethics with the Archangel Michael).
95
Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., No. 11-10230, 2018 WL
3216012, at *8 (D. Mass. June 28, 2018) (finding that the reasonable person would know
that “[a] lodestar is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonable
expended [by a lawyer] on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”).
96
See, e.g., WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(4) (2019) (defining the arbiters of disqualification
as “well-informed persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the justice
system”).
97
Spriggs v. Gonzales, No. 07-16-00418-CV, 2018 WL 4403352, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2018) (“But, that ‘reasonable person’ must be aware of the ‘facts of life’ which
surround the judiciary.”) (quoting Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 805 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993) (Osborn, C.J., concurring)).
98
See, e.g., Ex Parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 116–17 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (assuming
that community members are familiar with the everyday realities of a law practice).
99
See, e.g., United States v. Kohring, No. 3:07–CR–00055–JWS, 2008 WL 1746700,
at *8 (D. Alaska Apr. 14, 2008) (assuming that the ordinary observer knows the duties of the
chief judge of a federal district court), vacated on other grounds, 637 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.
2011).
100
United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the
reasonable person reviews the record and the law); Ponder v. State, 382 S.E.2d 204, 205 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the reasonable person would infer that the defendant received
certain admonishments at a pre-trial conference); see also Harden v. City of Gadsden, 821
F. Supp. 1446, 1451 n.14 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (“In determining the relevant facts, a reasonable
person would review the entire 672 pages of the trial transcript instead of relying on the
seventeen pages appended to the City’s recusal motion.”).
101
See A.E. Higganbotham v. Okla. Trans. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir.
2003) (“It is, of course, ‘an inescapable part of our system of government that judges are
drawn primarily from lawyers who have participated in public and political affairs.’”); In re
Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Merit selection of federal judges means selection
by merit from among a group that rises to attention on other grounds—grounds not
exclusively political, but often so.”); In re Disqualification of Ghiz, 55 N.E.3d 1113, 1115
(Ohio 2015) (“Many judges were involved in politics before taking the bench.”).
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Few limits attach to the encyclopedic and sometimes psychic knowledge
attributed to the average member of the public. For example, courts have attributed
the following knowledge to the reasonable person in the context of judicial
impartiality and recusal:
• that the challenged judge was “evidently the first judge to have appointed a
Master to investigate the reliability of representations made by lawyers in
seeking an award of attorneys’ fees in a class action”;102
• that a lawyer provided his expert witness with incomplete and inaccurate
data;103
• that the challenged judge found remarks directed toward him to be
laughable;104
• that the trial judge “was publicly ordained as a Sixth Avenue deacon”;105
• that the challenged judge had presided over many death penalty cases without
a challenge to the judge’s impartiality;106
• an appellate judge’s voting record in personal injury cases;107
• the challenged judge’s entire judicial record.108
Burdening the average onlooker with complete knowledge and understanding
of every facet of the law and every ruling of a judge may be a legal fiction necessary
to excavate a disqualification decision from the nadirs of an appearance-based
recusal scheme. But imputing this fantasized level of information to the reasonable
person cannot advance the ABA’s desire to buttress public faith in the judiciary by
bringing the public into the recusal process.109 There is only one way to maintain
any modicum of legitimacy in the concept of the fully informed lay observer in
recusal jurisprudence—enhance the reasonable person’s knowledge with artificial
intelligence.110
(b) The Reasonable Person Is an “Outsider”
In addition to requiring that the reasonable person be fully informed,
appearance-based disqualification requires that the reasonable person not be a

102

Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., No. 11-10230, 2018 WL
3216012, at *27 (D. Mass. June 28, 2018) (emphasis added).
103
Paul v. D & B Tile of Hialeah, Inc., No. 09-60259-CIV, 2009 WL 2430901, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2009).
104
United States v. Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99 (D. Mass. 1998).
105
Drake v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1347 (N.D. Ala. 2007).
106
Miles v. Ryan, 697 F.3d 1090, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2012).
107
Doe v. Stegall, 900 So. 2d 357, 362 (Miss. 2004).
108
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2011).
109
See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality,
97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 201 (2011) (“[T]he ‘public’ is highly unlikely to have the requisite
‘knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry. . . .’”).
110
See infra Part II.
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member of the legal profession.111 That means the reasonable person deciding
recusal issues cannot be a judge or even a lawyer.112 The lay observer requirement
is essential if appearance-based disqualification is to maintain its theoretical claim
as an objective test. In practice, however, it is generally the challenged judge who
determines whether judicial impartiality might reasonably be questioned.113 Chief
Justice John Roberts outlined recusal procedure in federal courts:
All of the federal courts follow essentially the same process in resolving
recusal questions. In the lower courts, individual judges decide for
themselves whether recusal is warranted, sometimes in response to a
formal written motion from a party, and sometimes at the judge’s own
initiative.114
Similarly, state court judges usually decide their own recusal issues.115 This
widespread practice rests on historical precedent, judicial code provisions assigning
the task to the challenged judge, and the somewhat self-serving assumption that the
judge knows best.116
Some states require a judge other than the challenged judge to resolve
disqualification motions.117 But whether the challenged judge or another judge hears
the motion, the ultimate determination is not made by someone “outside the legal
system” as contemplated by an objective standard. To avoid this flaw in appearancebased disqualification, courts invoke the fiction that judges disregard their own
111
See United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing the
reasonable person as outside the judicial system); Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of
Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189,
197 (2007) (stating that courts “stress” that the reasonable person is a person outside the
judicial system).
112
Copeland v. Copeland, 904 So. 2d 1066, 1071 (Miss. 2004) (“Impartiality is viewed
under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis using an objective reasonable ‘person, not
a lawyer or judge, standard.’”) (citing Dodson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 839 So. 2d 530,
534 (Miss. 2003)); see also Christina Reichert, Comment, Should I Stay or Should I Go Now:
Foreign Law Implications for the Supreme Court’s Recusal Problem, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1195, 1218 (2014) (observing that in Australia, the reasonable person in disqualification
matters is not a lawyer).
113
Debra Lyn Basset, Three Reasons Why the Challenged Judge Should Not Rule on a
Judicial Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 659, 679 (2015) (“Nevertheless,
in the vast majority of circumstances, the challenged judge decides the disqualification
motion.”).
114
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 7–8 (2011).
115
JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL
STANDARDS 19 (2008).
116
See McKoski, supra note 18, at 448–50 (explaining the justifications offered for
permitting challenged judges to decide their own recusal issues).
117
See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)–(g) (2019).
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views of the circumstances and divine how the reasonable layperson would assess
the situation.118 Thus, the judge, as the ultimate insider, takes all the factual and legal
information known to the judge, retreats to chambers, applies the facts and the law
to judicial code provisions, and emerges with the average layperson’s assessment of
whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. And the judge
accomplishes this feat without helpful disqualification jurisprudence, focus groups,
polling, empirical or even anecdotal evidence of how non-lawyers view the potential
conflict.
The process by which a judge is both the interpreter and object of the “might
reasonably be questioned” standard is reminiscent of regulatory capture. Regulatory
capture occurs when a regulatory agency becomes “too cozy” with the industry that
it regulates.119 When that happens, the agency loses its objectivity in determining the
measures necessary to protect the public from misdeeds of the regulated industry.
The underlying causes of regulatory capture vary but usually involve: (1) a close
personal relationship between the regulators and members of the industry; (2)
“shared professional norms, and education, common culture or class position”; and
(3) regulators who are former employees of the industry or hope to be employed in
the industry when they leave the agency.120 It is bad enough when the regulators are
so closely aligned with the regulated so as to cloud objective decision-making. Any
suggestion that members of an industry wear two hats, one as promoters of the
industry and another as protector of the public against overreaching by the industry
would be dismissed as absurd. But judges are in this precise situation when
evaluating recusal issues. The judiciary is the industry regulated by the prohibition
against judges presiding in matters in which their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. At the same time, members of the judiciary are the regulators deciding
when the test has been met. The impossibility of the conflicting positions is no
secret.121
C. Surveying Traditional Recusal Reform Proposals
Commentators suggest a series of patchwork reforms to cure the ills of
appearance-based disqualification including: (1) requiring that independent judges
hear recusal motions; (2) mandating written disqualification decisions; (3) the
118

Marko v. Marko, 816 N.W.2d 820, 827 (S.D. 2012) (“A judge’s own subjective
view is not relevant to the ‘appearance of partiality’ inquiry. ‘Judges must imagine how a
reasonable, well-informed observer of the judicial system would react.’” (quoting In re
Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990))).
119
J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018).
120
Id.; Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement:
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVT’L. L.J. 81, 111 (2002).
121
See State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 882 (Wis. 2010) (“Commentators have
variously described a lack of independent review of a judge’s decision on a recusal challenge
as ‘one of the most heavily criticized features of U.S. disqualification law,’ a ‘Catch-22’ and
akin to having a student ‘grade his own paper.’” (citations omitted)).
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preemptory disqualification of trial judges; and (4) granting lay panels the authority
to decide recusal issues.122 As demonstrated below, most proposals fail to address
the inherent failings of the current disqualification regime and proposals that do
directly attack the faults of appearance-based disqualification have not received a
warm reception by the courts.
1. Independent Judges
Requiring a judge other than the challenged judge to rule on a motion for
disqualification is a frequently suggested recusal reform.123 Proponents argue that an
independent judge will assess the circumstances neutrally, avoiding the challenged
judge’s natural inclination to deny harboring a bias and to deny engaging in conduct
that creates an appearance of bias. As a result, the theory goes, independent judges
are likely to grant disqualification motions more often.124 This proposal ignores the
tendency of judges to show deference to their colleagues and the reluctance of a
judge to impugn another judge’s impartiality by removing a fellow judge from a
case.125 Indeed, the authors of one study concluded “that judges are more inclined to
disqualify themselves than they are to recommend that a colleague do so.”126 But a
more fundamental deficiency in the independent-judge proposal is that switching
one judge for another does nothing to bring the public into the courtroom. The view
of the reasonable layperson, which under appearance-based disqualification must
govern the recusal decision, is still filtered through the ultimate “insider”— a judge.

122

See infra Section I.C.1.–4.
See William E. Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court From Itself”?:
Recusal, Separation of Powers, and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 772
(2010) (stating that as of the year 2000, fifteen states required an independent judge to decide
recusal motions and that number has remained static).
124
See Stempel, supra note 34, at 796–97 (concluding that “there is simply too much
inertia in favor of non-disqualification, which results in insufficiently frequent recusal when
challenged judges assess questions of their own impartiality or public perception of it.”).
125
See Dmitry Bam, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135,
1192 (2015); cf. Gillian R. Chadwick, Reorienting the Rules of Evidence, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2115, 2161 (2018) (“[S]trong forces make it difficult to admit the bias that exists in
one’s own community.”); Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented
Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 585–86 (2005) (“A more significant
problem with this proposal is that judges might not be any more willing to disqualify their
colleagues than they are to recuse themselves. Judges might find it difficult to grant a motion
to disqualify, fearing it would offend a fellow judge.”).
126
JEFFERY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 67 (Am. Judicature Soc’y 1995)
(“The data from this survey show that judges are more inclined to disqualify themselves than
they are to recommend that a colleague do so.”).
123
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2. Mandating that Judges Provide Reasons Supporting Recusal Decisions
Some commentators promote a requirement that judges provide written or
recorded reasons for granting or denying disqualification motions as a way to
develop a body of case law upon which judges may rely in assessing whether their
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.127 Even staunch supporters of the
proposal, however, admit that the failure of judges to record their rationales, “is not
the gravest problem with modern disqualification.”128 That is because an increase in
written recusal decisions is of little value when reviewing courts caution that
disqualification motions should be decided on their unique facts rather than “by
comparison to similar situations addressed by prior jurisprudence.”129 Moreover,
most written recusal decisions offer little substantive analysis. Judges often follow
a simple decisional format by: (1) detailing the facts surrounding the disqualification
issue; (2) reciting general propositions of disqualification law;130 and (3) concluding
that “clearly,” “plainly,” or “undoubtedly” the reasonable observer would not
question the judge’s impartiality under the circumstances presented.131 Finally, as
with the majority of other proposals to reform the disqualification process, a judicial
officer, not an outsider, determines whether a judge remains on a case.
127

Stempel, supra note 34, at 799 (“Written explanations of recusal decisions would
also in turn develop a more comprehensive body of precedent to guide the legal community
and the bench.”); see also Melinda A. Marbes, Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating
Decisionmaker Bias and Promoting Public Confidence, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 807, 857 (2015)
(arguing that written decisions “will not only legitimize the specific disqualification decision,
but will help create an entire body of law on disqualification that will guide future disputes
and legitimize the judiciary as a whole.”).
128
Stempel, supra note 34, at 799.
129
United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 80
and accompanying text.
130
See, e.g., Pellegrini v. Merchant, No. 1:16-cv-01292 LJO-BAM, 2017 WL 735740,
at *2–*3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017).
131
See, e.g., United States v. Mix, No. 12–171, 2014 WL 580758, at *16 (E.D. La. Feb.
13, 2014) (“Clearly the foregoing facts do not present an instance where reasonable person,
knowing all of the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality as is
required under § 455(a).”); Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 639, 647
(E.D. La. 2006) (“Clearly, a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would
recognize that the undersigned would be impartial.”); Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 792 F. Supp.
72, 74–75 (D. Alaska 1992) (“Clearly, a reasonable person would not doubt a judge’s
impartiality on that basis. While the average citizen might believe federal judges are for sale,
it is unlikely that she would believe they come so cheap.”); see also Perlmutter v. Verone,
No. GJH–14–2566, 2015 WL 4757183, at *5 n.8 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2015) (quoting a state
court judge’s finding that the “vague allegations . . . plainly would not provide a reasonable
person with grounds to question Judge Salant’s impartiality.”); Leja v. Schmidt Mfg., Inc.,
Civ. No. 01–5042(DRD), 2010 WL 2571850, *3 (D. N.J. June 22, 2010) (quoting a state
judge’s finding that a “reasonable person would undoubtedly draw the conclusion” that the
judge was not disqualified).
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3. Peremptory Challenges
Similar to a party’s right to peremptorily excuse a prospective juror, eighteen
states permit a litigant to disqualify one trial judge automatically.132 Some states
require a simple request to remove a judge, while other jurisdictions require a
perfunctory affidavit claiming that the judge is biased against a party.133 Although
not without its critics,134 the automatic substitution of judges has worked reasonably
well135 for more than one hundred and seventy years.136 Preemptory challenges work
precisely because they reject the major tenant of appearance-based
disqualification—that a disinterested, objective, fully informed person determine
that a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Peremptory disqualification is not governed by an objective standard.137 The
view of the ordinary, reasonable person plays no role in deciding whether a judge
remains on a case. To the contrary, peremptorily removing a judge employs a
quintessentially subjective test. A litigant’s subjective opinion of a judge’s
impartiality controls. Nor does such automatic disqualification require a fully
informed decision-maker. A litigant exercising a peremptory challenge can be
uninformed, misinformed, or delusional for that matter. Likewise, peremptory
disqualification does not demand a disinterested decision-maker. Unlike the
reasonable person, a litigant is the most interested and least objective person in the
courtroom. Further, peremptory disqualification statutes provide what is impossible
under appearance-based rules—predictable and uniform results. If a litigant makes
a request or files a motion, the judge is disqualified.
Two dynamics prevent peremptory disqualification from effectively reforming
recusal procedures. First, the number of states with peremptory disqualification
statutes has not increased in the last forty years,138 and the federal courts are
unalterably opposed to the procedure.139 Second, instead of replacing the “might
132

See McKoski, supra note 18, at 468 (citing ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 6 n.17 (2011) (listing states
permitting the automatic disqualification of trial judges)). The preemptory disqualification
of reviewing court judges presents unique problems. See id. at 472 n.382.
133
Id. at 468–69.
134
Id. at 470–72.
135
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges as Access Enhancers, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2263, 2265 (2018) [hereinafter Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges]
(stating that peremptory disqualification “appears to work well”).
136
See, e.g., McGoon v. Little, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 42 (1845) (citing the statute requiring an
automatic change of judge upon the filing of an affidavit by a party alleging judicial
prejudice).
137
See John R. Bartels, Peremptory Challenges to Federal Judges: A Judge’s View, 68
A.B.A. J. 449, 451 (1982) (criticizing the subjective nature of peremptory judicial recusal).
138
Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges, supra note 135, at 2272.
139
Bartels, supra note 137, at 450–51; see also David Ingram, Federal Judges Push
Back Against Recusal Proposals, Congress Considers Revising Rules on Judge
Disqualifications, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 14, 2009 (“The Judicial Conference has opposed
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reasonably be questioned test” with the right to an automatic substitution of one trial
judge, jurisdictions adopting peremptory disqualification have retained the
appearance-based test. That means judges still must apply the test when a litigant
claims that a successor judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.140
4. Judicial Recusal Panels
Professor Dmitri Bam proposes a change to recusal procedures that, consistent
with the theoretical foundation of appearance-based disqualification, places the
recusal decision in the hands of those outside the judiciary.141 Bam suggests that
panels of laypersons could offer guidance to judges facing recusal issues or, better
yet, review a judge’s decision or make the decision for the judge.142 However, no
state has been bold enough to embark on a procedure that would sanction joint factfinding by judges and laypersons or authorize a lay panel to overrule a judge’s
decision.
II. THE ADVANTAGES OF BIG DATA
This Article proposes that big data can transform appearance-based
disqualification into what its creators envisioned—an objective test producing
uniform disqualification decisions.143 Injecting big data into the recusal process will
ensure the involvement of a fully informed, reasonable, decision-maker who sits
outside the judicial system. It will eliminate or significantly reduce implicit judicial
biases in the decision-making process, reduce judicial stress, and save precious
[automatic disqualification] proposals for at least three decades. . . .”); Russell R. Wheeler,
A Primer on Regulating Federal Judicial Ethics, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 490 (2014) (stating
that in 2009, the United States Judicial Conference resisted an automatic disqualification
proposal for federal judges “on the practical grounds that finding replacement judges in small
districts would be difficult and on the policy grounds that giving parties the right of automatic
disqualification was akin to permitting judge-shopping.”).
140
Challenges to successor judges based on an appearance of bias would likely be few
in number. See McKoski, supra note 18, at 472 (“Allowing each party one peremptory
challenge should satisfy most litigants that an impartial trial judge will decide their case.”).
141
Bam, supra note 125, at 1191–92.
142
Id. Professor Bam also suggests that lawyers could join laypersons on the recusal
panels. Id. at 1191. Other authors have made similar suggestions. Cf. Roy A. Schotland, A
Plea for Reality, 74 MO. L. REV. 507, 521 (2009) (suggesting that before ruling on a recusal
motion, reviewing court justices consult “with a panel of three court-appointed ‘wise souls’
(probably retired judges, lawyers, and legal academics. . . .)”). However, one might observe
that Professor Bam’s suggestion to include lawyers on recusal panels would detract from the
intended “outsider” makeup of the panels.
143
See Hearings, supra note 21, at 13 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (justifying the
adoption of an objective test to govern federal disqualification by the need to bring “clarity
and certainty” to judicial disqualification); Geyh, supra note 16, at 691 (identifying one goal
of appearance-based disqualification as making judicial disqualification “less capricious”).
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judicial resources. Importantly, even if big data analytics proves to be unhelpful in
this regard, the experiment will not injure any litigant or diminish public confidence
in the judiciary.
A. Big Data Fully-Informs the Reasonable Person
Big data legitimatizes an essential—yet currently fictional—characteristic of
the lay decision-maker in judicial disqualification matters—that the reasonable
person is fully informed. This unbounded knowledge and wisdom attributed to the
lay observer is currently an unmitigated fiction.144 Much of the information
attributed to the ordinary observer in the context of judicial recusals is actually
unknown to the person on the street and, in some cases, is even beyond the judge’s
knowledge or recollection. For example, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Judge
Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a
disqualification motion, finding that “[a] reasonable person familiar with [his]
judicial record throughout [his] career, and the other facts relevant to this recusal
inquiry” would not question Judge Reinhardt’s impartiality.145 It seems safe to say
that the ordinary observer would not have command of the rulings made by Judge
Reinhardt during his thirty-year career as a federal judge.146 It is also reasonable to
assume that Judge Reinhardt would not recall every case in which he participated.
The reasonable observer, however, enhanced with big data’s access to the pleadings,
motions, orders, transcripts, and other court documents in each of the thousands of
matters handled by Judge Reinhardt would be completely familiar with the judge’s
judicial record. Moreover, big data would include each of Judge Reinhardt’s
speeches and law review articles relevant to the recusal inquiry.147
B. Big Data Is Not an Insider
As discussed above, one reason the “might reasonably be questioned” test fails
to live up to its objective label is that an “insider”—a judge—rather than someone
outside the legal system, decides recusal questions.148 Indeed, the ultimate insider,
the challenged judge, usually determines whether the circumstances call into
question the judge’s impartiality. Permitting big data to control the ethical propriety
of a judge remaining on a case removes this “insider” impediment by applying a
144

See supra Section I.B.2.a.
630 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2011).
146
Id. (stating that Judge Reinhardt had been a member of the federal judiciary for thirty
years).
147
In discussing the reasonable person’s view of the facts supporting the recusal motion
in Perry, Judge Reinhardt cites one of his law review articles, Stephen Reinhardt, The
Conflict Between Text and Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
434 (1988), adapted from a speech at the Federalist Society’s Sixth Annual Symposium on
Law and Public Policy. Perry, 630 F.3d at 916.
148
See supra Section I.B.2.b.
145
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truly objective test. With big data analytics, the judge is no longer the sole interpreter
and object of the appearance-based disqualification standard.
C. Big Data Mitigates the Cognitive Biases of Judges
Predictive algorithms have the potential to eliminate or reduce cognitive and
other biases that distort judicial decisions, including rulings in disqualification
matters.149 Implicit biases reflecting negative stereotyping based on race, gender
identity, age, immigration status, and other characteristics may work to the detriment
of even “privileged minorities.”150 Compounding the problem, the subconscious
misuse of decision-making heuristics may influence the objectivity of a judge’s
decision.151 To reduce automatic biases at work in bail and sentencing decisions,
some courts have instructed judges to use algorithms known as risk assessment
tools.152 Big data analytics can be employed in the same manner to reduce
subconscious biases in disqualification decisions. Although some bias may be
inherent in algorithmic processing because humans create the algorithms,153 at least
the biases will not be those of the challenged judge.154

149

See STANFORD U., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030 8 (2016),
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf [https://
perma.cc/88Y2-RXXL] (“AI prediction tools have the potential to provide new kinds of
transparency about data and inferences, and may be applied to detect, remove, or reduce
human bias, rather than reinforcing it.”); Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 113 (2017) (finding
that “automatic biases and cognitions indeed influence a much broader range of judicial
decisions than has ever been considered.”).
150
Levinson et al., supra note 149, at 68.
151
See Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental
Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis”, 99 KY. L.J. 269, 306–07 (2011).
152
Marla N. Greenstein, Judicial Ethics of Bail Decision Making, 57 JUDGES’ J. 40, 40
(2018). For a description of risk assessments tools used in the pre-trial release decisions
involving criminal defendants, see Brook Hopkins & Colin Doyle, The Pathways of Pretrial
Reform, 57 JUDGES’ J. 31, 33 (2018).
153
See Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845,
859 n.85 (2018) (“There is a growing literature on the biases inherent in artificial
intelligence, machine learning, and algorithmic processing.”).
154
The danger of embedding implicit biases into algorithms used to decide
disqualification issues lies in the fact that “AI systems are commonly ‘taught’ by reading,
viewing, and listening to copies of works created by humans[,]” Amanda Levendowski, How
Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV.
579, 582 (2018), and judges and lawyers will have authored many of the documents used to
inform recusal algorithms.
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D. Big Data Brings Collateral Benefits to the Judiciary
Reliance on big data will produce the collateral benefit of reducing judicial
stress.155 It will also free-up judicial time for other tasks. Because challenges to
judicial impartiality go to the essence of a judge’s worth, judges often feel compelled
to refute the charge in excruciating detailed, time-consuming, lengthy orders.156
E. Big Data Can Do No Harm
Courts can incorporate big data into the disqualification process in a way to
protect litigants’ rights and public confidence in the judiciary, even if big data
analytics fails to produce results more uniform and consistent than the current
disqualification regime. First, state and federal judicial conduct codes direct judges
to initially determine whether recusal is required.157 This self-assessment is
obligatory regardless of whether a litigant files a motion for the judge’s
disqualification.158 If the judge recuses herself at this initial stage, the matter is
assigned to another judge.159 No other inquiry, with or without the help of big data,
is necessary. Second, if after the initial assessment, the judge concludes that recusal
is not required but that facts exist that “the parties or their lawyers might reasonably
consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification,” judicial codes require
the judge to disclose that information.160 If, after the disclosure, a litigant files a
motion for disqualification, the judge may grant the motion, and the case will be
reassigned to another judge.161 If the judge does not summarily grant the
disqualification motion, then under the procedure suggested here, the judge would
refer the matter for a big data analysis. Third, under the current procedure, a litigant

155

Cf. Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 653
(2015) (“Even an unbiased judge may worry that a recusal sends a message that he is
biased.”); R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse: Foreign Common Law Guidance
& Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1833 (2005)
(“[A]sking a challenged Justice to rule on a motion to recuse puts that Justice in a precarious
position.”).
156
See, e.g., Ark. Teacher Retirement System v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., No.
11-10230, 2018 WL 3216012, at *1 (D. Mass 2018) (denying a recusal motion in a 17,000word order); United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D. Mass. 2015) (denying a
recusal motion in a 29,000-word order); United States v. Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.
Mass. 1998) (denying a motion to recuse in a 14,000-word order).
157
See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A judge
shall disqualify himself or herself . . .”).
158
Id.
159
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (providing for reassignment to a successor judge
upon a judge’s recusal).
160
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
161
See infra note 164.
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may file a disqualification motion independent of any disclosure by the judge.162 In
that event, the judge may again summarily grant the motion, and the case will be
reassigned to another judge.163 Under the proposed procedure, if the judge does not
summarily grant the motion, the judge would refer the matter for a big data analysis.
Optimally, big data’s conclusion as to whether the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned would constitute a mandatory presumption. Thus, if
analytics determined that the circumstances created a reasonable question as to the
judge’s impartiality, recusal would be required. If the analysis determined that no
reasonable question of the judge’s impartiality existed, the case would remain with
the judge. However, courts may resist surrendering the disqualification decision to
artificial intelligence.164 If so, as an alternative, the conclusion arrived at through
analytics could serve as a rebuttable presumption, leaving the final recusal decision
with the judge.165
Most importantly, this disqualification protocol protects the parties and the
public if the big data analysis process proves a failure because the parties would be
in no worse positions than under current recusal procedures. Under the suggested
procedure, a judge only sends a case for a big data evaluation if the judge initially
162

See, e.g., RULES OF PROC. OF CAL. ST. BAR, R. 5.46(H) (2019) (“If a judge refuses
or fails to disqualify himself or herself, any party may file a motion to disqualify.”); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 18a(a) (2019) (“A party in a case in any trial court other than a statutory probate court
or justice court may seek to recuse or disqualify a judge who is sitting in the case by filing a
motion with the clerk of the court in which the case is pending.”); W. VA. TRIAL CT. R.
17.01(a) (2019) (“In any proceeding, any party may file a written motion for disqualification
of a judge within thirty (30) days after discovering the ground for disqualification. . . .”); see
also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
LAW 73 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2010) (“[T]he disqualification process [in federal
court] may be triggered by a judge on his or her own initiative, or by a party, on motion.”).
163
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 42.2(e)(4) (2019) (“If grounds for disqualification are
found, the presiding judge must promptly reassign the action.”); U.S. Dist. Ct. R. D. Vt.,
Order 73(h) (2015) (“If a judge is disqualified to hear a case assigned to him/her, the judge
will provide the clerk with a disqualification order and the clerk shall reassign the case at
random.”).
164
See Tania Sourdin & Richard Cornes, Do Judges Need to be Human? The
Implications of Technology for Responsive Judging, in THE RESPONSIVE JUDGE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 87 (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2018) (“[T]he
capacity for [artificial intelligence] decisions to be appealed or reviewed by human decisionmakers is often cited as a necessary component of any automated decision-making system.”);
Noel L. Hillmam, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 58
JUDGES’ J. 36 (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_
journal/2019/winter/the-use-artificial-intelligence-gauging-risk-recidivism/ [https://perma.
cc/4HKF-YZT4] (arguing that sentencing is a human endeavor and “should not be merely
the function of an algorithm”).
165
Presumptions are not unknown in judicial disqualification jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 9 (2019) (“There is a rebuttable presumption that
there is no per se basis for disqualification where the aggregate [campaign] contributions are
equal to or less than the maximum allowable contribution permitted by law.”).
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decides to keep the case. For example, assume that a party files a disqualification
motion that the judge believes lacks merit. Under the suggested procedure, the judge
could not deny the motion without referring the matter for a big data evaluation. The
outcome of the analysis may confirm the judge’s determination that the
circumstances do not create an appearance of partiality. But even if big data’s
conclusion is wrong, the parties are in no worse position because the judge had
initially denied the motion for disqualification. On the other hand, if big data
analytics erroneously concludes that the circumstances create an appearance of
partiality, the parties are no worse off because the only consequence of the erroneous
finding is that the case is assigned to another judge who is presumed to be
impartial.166 And, while parties have a right to an impartial judge, they have no right
to a particular judge.167 In the end, regardless of the accuracy of the big data analysis,
the parties receive an impartial judge and the public benefits from a truly objective
disqualification decision.
An examination of disqualification issues that arise from contributions by
lawyers and litigants to a judicial candidate’s election campaign illustrates how
analytics can help cure the deficiencies in appearance-based disqualification and
provide an objective determination of when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.
III. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:
A BIG DATA APPROACH
The disqualification of judges because of contributions made by lawyers,
litigants, and interest groups to the judges’ election campaigns supplies the perfect
test for disqualification decisions informed by big data. That is so for two reasons.
First, the effect of campaign contributions on a judge’s impartiality—in fact and
appearance—continues to perplex the courts, commentators, and the public.168 There
simply is no generally accepted method of determining when a judge should be
barred from hearing a contributor’s case or when a judge’s impartiality might
166
The transfer of a case to a successor judge may cause a delay in the proceedings but
that delay is present every time a judge is disqualified or otherwise removed from a case.
167
United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 122 (D. Mass 2015) (“Litigants are
entitled to a judge who is, and to a reasonable person appears to be, impartial. However, they
are not entitled to a judge of their own choosing.”); State v. Harris, 735 N.W.2d 774, 782–
83 (Neb. 2007) (“[W]hile a defendant may be entitled to an impartial judge, a defendant does
not have the right to have his or her case heard before any particular judge.”).
168
See Matthew W. Green, Jr. et al., The Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its
Effect on Judicial Independence, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 505 (2012) (concluding that
campaign contributions to judges presents a difficult problem with no easy solutions); Aman
McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial Selection Reform
Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 521 (2005) (noting the “ineffectiveness” of reforms
intended to diminish the appearance of partiality caused by judges receiving campaign
contributions).
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reasonably be questioned because of a person or entity’s financial support of a
judge’s election bid.169 Second, there is an enormous amount of highly relevant
public information that, with the aid of big data analytics, can make campaign
contribution disqualification decisions uniform, consistent, and reliable.170
A simple rule could eliminate any appearance of bias created by campaign
contributions. The rule would automatically disqualify a judge from a case in which
a lawyer or litigant contributed to the judge’s campaign in a sum greater than an
amount predetermined by the jurisdiction to cause the lay observer to reasonably
question the judge’s impartiality. The ABA has suggested this approach since
1999.171 A simple approach, however, is not necessarily a popular approach. Only
five states have taken the ABA’s advice and require a judge’s recusal after the
judge’s campaign receives a contribution above a preset limit.172 Utah’s Code of
Judicial Conduct provides for mandatory recusal when a judge receives
contributions totaling more than $50.00 from a lawyer or litigant in a three-year
period.173 States without a judicial code provision setting an automatic recusal
amount rely on the general “might reasonably be questioned” standard to determine
when a contribution creates a disqualifying appearance of partiality.174 Courts in
169

See infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187–204 and accompanying text.
171
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999).
172
Alabama, Arizona, California, Mississippi, and Utah all mandate disqualification
when contributions reach a certain amount. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS CTR. FOR
JUD. ETHICS, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS (Nov.
2016), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20
Ethics/Disqualificationcontributions.ashx [https://perma.cc/KF3V-GBC7]. The Arizona
judicial code requires disqualification in matters involving a party or lawyer who has “within
the previous four years made aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign an amount that
is greater than the amounts permitted [by state law].” ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R.
2.11(A)(4) (2009); see also Ryan M. Mcinerney, Note, Rethinking Judicial Disqualifications
Based on Campaign Contributions: A Practical Critique of Post-Caperton Proposals and a
Call for Greater Transparency, 11 NEV. L.J. 815, 821 (2011) (“[M]ost states have been
hesitant to adopt [ABA] Model Rule 2.11(A)(4) or similar disqualification language that
takes into account campaign support, no matter how large.”).
173
UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2018).
174
See, e.g., Pa. Jud. Conduct Board, Statement of Policy Regarding Disqualification
Based on Campaign Contributions Under Rule 2.11(A)(4), at 5 (Nov. 4, 2016),
http://judicialconductboardofpa.org/wp-content/uploads/11-04-2016-Press-Release-BoardIssues-Statements-of-Policy-Regarding-Investigations-of-Campaign-Contributions-Electro
nic-Communications.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCF8-4LS5] [hereinafter Pa. Statement of
Policy] (stating the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “eschewed” any rule automatically
requiring disqualification upon a contribution above a fixed amount); see also WIS. SUP. CT.
R. 60.04(7) (2014) (“A judge shall not be required to recuse himself or herself in a proceeding
based solely on any endorsement or the judge’s campaign committee’s receipt of a lawful
campaign contribution, including a campaign contribution from an individual or entity
involved in the proceeding.”).
170
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those states often provide a nonexclusive list of factors to help a judge decide if a
contribution necessitates disqualification.175
The amount of money contributed to a judge’s campaign usually tops the list of
relevant factors.176 But even more important than the amount itself is the amount of
the contribution in relation to the total amount of money raised by the judicial
candidate.177 Thus, a $2,000 contribution when a candidate raises a total of $4,000
might be more significant than if the $2,000 contribution is part of a candidate’s two
million dollar war chest.178 The timing of a contribution may also affect the public’s
perception of a judge’s impartiality179 because “the effect of contributions will
generally dissipate over time.”180 Similarly, a contribution might increase the
perception of bias if made close in time to the filing of a lawsuit or the setting of a
trial date.181 Although admittedly difficult to gauge, courts consider the impact of a
contribution on the outcome of an election.182 Thus, if a lawyer or litigant makes a
sizable contribution to underwrite an extensive media campaign in the final stages
of a close contest, that contribution may be more likely to create an appearance of
bias than if the candidate uses a similar contribution early in the campaign for a voter

175

See, e.g., GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2019).
See, e.g., id. R. 2.11(A)(4)(a).
177
See WASH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(D)(1) (2013) (identifying a relevant
factor to be “the total amount of financial support provided by the party relative to the total
amount of the financial support for the judge’s election”); Pa. Statement of Policy, supra
note 174, at 6 (suggesting one factor to be “the amount of contribution[s] in relation to the
total amount of contributions received by the judge. . . .”).
178
See Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 299 P.3d 354, 358 (Nev. 2013) (finding
disqualification unnecessary where the trial judge received $10,000 in campaign
contributions from a party and the party’s lawyer and the contribution constituted 14% of the
total raised by the judge).
179
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009) (“The
temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the
pendency of the case is also critical.”).
180
Pa. Statement of Policy, supra note 174, at 2 (“[T]he effect of contributions will
generally dissipate over time. The larger the contribution, the longer it will take to
dissipate.”).
181
Id. at 9; see also TENN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. [7](3) (2015)
(identifying one relevant factor to be “[t]he timing of the support or contributions in relation
to the case for which disqualification is sought.”); Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign
Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006)
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html [https://perma.cc/ARQ5-YFBN]
(“On scores of occasions, the [Ohio Supreme Court] justices’ campaigns took contributions
after a case involving the contributor was argued and before it was decided—just when
conflicts are most visible and pointed.”).
182
See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884 (stating that the disqualification inquiry centers in
part on “the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election”).
176
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registration drive.183 The nature of the judicial office sought might also influence the
public’s perception of a donation because the public expects and tolerates larger
contributions for higher judicial offices.184
While important, the factors identified by the courts appear to be limited by
what information the courts believe that the parties can reasonably assemble on the
disqualification issue. Except for the impact of a particular contribution on an
election outcome, all of the information identified as relevant to a contributionrelated disqualification question is available on campaign disclosure websites.185 In
the era of big data, however, there is no reason to exclude other highly relevant
information simply because it is much too voluminous for the parties to gather or
make sense of. For example, a donor’s history of contributions in all judicial
campaigns would certainly be relevant to a judge’s recusal decision. Has the
contributor donated a similar amount to every judge running for election or
retention? Has the donor only contributed to judges before whom the donor has
cases? Is the contribution in question part of a pattern of contributions from similarly
situated donors like plaintiffs’ lawyers or the insurance industry?186 How does the
contribution amount compare in size and timing to contributions received statewide,
region-wide, and nationwide by other judicial candidates, adjusted for differences in
population, geographic area, and cost of living in the various election districts?187
183

Cf. id. at 897 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“What if the supporter’s expenditures are
used to fund voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts rather than television
advertisements?”).
184
See Pa. Statement of Policy, supra note 174, at 6.
185
See, e.g., Campaign Finance Database, FLA. DEPT. OF STATE, https://dos.elections.
myflorida.com/campaign-finance/contributions [https://perma.cc/CM24-Q48T] (providing a
searchable database for Florida state candidates from 1996–2018); Steve Parks for Judge
2014, MICHIGAN SECRETARY OF STATE, MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE SEARCHABLE
DATABASE, https://cfrsearch.nictusa.com/committees/516682 [https://perma.cc/L8NXDBAW]; id. at Campaign Statement Contributions, https://cfrsearch.nictusa.com/documents
/387975/details/filing/contributions?schedule=1A&changes=0
[https://perma.cc/E7JDKSXJ] (identifying campaign contributions by date, amount, donor name, donor address, and
donor occupation; identifying expenditures by date, amount, nature of the expenditure,
payee; identifying debts and obligations); see also Contributions and Expenditures
Databases, N.Y. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.ny.gov/contribandex
pend.html [https://perma.cc/VJ6G-WULS]; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(7) cmt. (2014) (requiring
the public reporting of all campaign contributions).
186
See Catherine Turcer & Mia Lewis, Can Money Buy Justice? Contributions to Ohio
Supreme Court Candidates 2018, COMMON CAUSE OHIO (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.commoncause.org/ohio/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2018/10/OhioSupreme
Court_WEB_r1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK2B-SDNK] (listing the top donors, and amounts
donated to four state supreme court candidates).
187
See generally Newspaper Ad Prices – by State, GABLER.COM,
http://www.gaebler.com/newspaper-ad-rates.htm [https://perma.cc/E5JN-EWQS] (last
visited Sept. 18, 2019) (listing newspaper advertising rates for urban, suburban, and rural
publications).
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Under some circumstances, campaign contributions made by the judge sought to be
disqualified may be relevant.188
In addition to detailed campaign contribution histories, big data can supply
relevant litigation information.189 What is the win-loss record of the contributor
before the judge?190 How often does the contributing party or lawyer appear before
the judge?191 Is the issue before the judge likely to affect other cases, or is it unique
to the contributor’s case?192 Has the judge ruled on the issue previously? Did the
188

Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of Selection: A Nationwide
Study of the Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1735–36 (2017) (assessing
the ideological preferences of judges, in part, by examining whether a judge contributed to
Democrat or Republican candidates).
189
For example, LexisNexis describes its “Context for Judges” as “a new offering from
the Lexis AnalyticsÔ suite” where “legal language analytics are deployed across tens of
millions of Lexis Advance case law documents” to produce and correlate judges’ rulings on
“100 different motion types.” Context for Judges: Know the Language. Write a Persuasive
Motion, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/context/judges.page
[https://perma.cc/B9J2-3RES] (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). The director of LexisNexis
product management explains, “No-one else can begin to do this—we’re not just saying ‘did
the judge grant this or deny that’ but what is the exact language he or she used. We take
every sentence and turn it into a data point that can be studied.” LexisNexis Launches WellTrailed Judge and Expert Witness Analytics Solution Context, LEGAL IT INSIDER (Nov. 29,
2018, 1:28 PM), https://www.legaltechnology.com/latest-news/lexisnexis-launches-welltrailed-judge-and-expert-witness-analytics-solution-context [https://perma.cc/6QWL-A9S4]
(quoting LexisNexis director of product management Mark Koussa). “Context” provides
court records for all federal judges and some state court judges. See LEXIS ADVANCE,
LEXISNEXIS CONTEXT SEARCH, https://advance.lexis.com/contexthome?cbc=0&crid=e421
2ebb-aa97-4936-ab0a-c85266f9a951# [https://perma.cc/3AFS-RKAA] (last visited Sept.
17, 2019).
190
See Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1,
25 n.111 (2011) (listing private attorneys who were major donors to the campaigns of Illinois
Supreme Court Justices and the contributors’ win and loss records before the court after the
donations); see also Andrew L. Frey & Jeffrey A. Berger, A Solution in Search of a Problem:
The Disconnect Between the Outcome in Caperton and the Circumstances of Justice
Benjamin’s Election, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 279, 287–88 (2010).
191
Rotunda, supra note 190, at 22 (“[F]ewer than 4% of the lawyers or parties who
appeared before the Illinois Supreme Court made a contribution to a winning candidate”);
see also Frey & Berger, supra note 190, at 286 (suggesting that whether a contributor is a
“repeat litigant” before the judge is of equal importance to whether the contributor has a case
pending before the judge at the time of the contribution).
192
See Woodland Hills Residents Ass’n. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 609 P.2d
1029, 1036 (Cal. 1980) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (recognizing that “the
significance of the issue being considered, would be relevant in judging the appearance of
bias”); see also N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 4 (N.D. SUP. CT. 2012) (directing
the judge to consider “the issues involved in the proceeding” when deciding a recusal issue
involving campaign contributions); Nicholas Almendares & Catherine Hafer, Beyond
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judge campaign on the issue at stake, or has the judge written, spoken, or tweeted
about the issue?193 Has the judge disqualified herself from other cases involving the
same party or lawyer, or from cases in which a party or lawyer contributed a similar
amount?194 Big data can supply the reasonable person with this information. 195
Big data can also help evaluate “the apparent effect [a] contribution had on the
outcome of the election.”196 While the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of this factor, the Court also conceded that requiring a judge to determine
“what ultimately drives the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult
endeavor, not likely to lend itself to a certain conclusion.”197 Because weighing this
factor amounts to nothing more than uneducated guesswork, some courts pay lip
service to the effect of a contribution on the election outcome but ignore the factor
in evaluating the disqualification issue.198 Analytics could legitimize this
consideration by providing an educated assessment of the “apparent effect” of a
contribution by evaluating factors known to influence the success or failure of
judicial candidates. These factors could include, the size and timing of the
contribution in question; other financing; the use to which the contribution is put;
advertising efforts; budget; name; gender; name recognition; voter turnout; voter
roll-off; ballot position; negative campaign tactics; political and economic
environment; endorsements by newspapers, political groups, individuals, unions,
and trade associations; and “blue” and “red” waves.199
Citizens United, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2755, 2786 (2016) (identifying one factor as “the
stake the contributor has in the policy at hand.”).
193
See Request to Recuse the Hon. Sharon Kennedy, Capital Care Network of Toledo
v. State Dep’t Department of Health, 153 Ohio St. 3d 362, 2018-Ohio-440, 106 N.E. 3d 1209
(Aug. 17, 2017), http://supremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=829404.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B9QM-E6T9] (seeking disqualification of a state supreme court justice
from a case involving an abortion provider in part because the judge (1) was the keynote
speaker at a right to life function; (2) stated in a questionnaire that life begins at fertilization;
and (3) stated that the Ohio Constitution contains no provision intended to require the use of
public funds for abortion).
194
See Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Phillips, 502 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Ark. 2016)
(noting that the judge had recused from cases involving “significant contributions” after
previous elections).
195
Cf. Frey & Berger, supra note 190, at 280 (criticizing Caperton for “its
unwillingness to evaluate the entire universe of facts”).
196
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).
197
Id. at 885; see also Frey & Berger, supra note 190, at 282–92 (discussing the
difficulty in determining what influences an election outcome).
198
See, e.g., Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 299 P.3d 354, 357–59 (Nev. 2013)
(mentioning the “apparent effect” factor, but never applying it to the facts of the case).
199
See Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the
Moment May Decide Your Future, 18 J. L. & POL. 643, 644 (2002); see also John Council,
‘Blue Wave’ Hits Texas Judiciary as Democrats Win Seats on Four Appellate Courts, TEX.
LAW. (Nov. 7, 2018) (“In upsets that few political observers . . . expected, Democrats took
five seats each on Houston’s all-Republican First Court of Appeals and all-Republican
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The algorithms developed to interpret big data in recusal matters could integrate
the public’s view of judicial elections and campaign contributions. On one hand, the
public overwhelmingly supports selecting judges by election rather than by
appointment. A Harris poll disclosed that 55% of respondents favored elected judges
while 19% favored appointed judges.200 An Alabama survey found that 85% of
voters preferred elected judges.201 On the other hand, polls consistently reveal that
approximately three-quarters of voters believe that campaign contributions have
some effect on judicial decisions.202 The relative weight assigned to these factors by
a particular jurisdiction in a big data analysis could vary widely.203 Regardless of the
different weights assigned by the states, the inclusion of public survey results would
allow public perceptions of elected judges and campaign contributions to play some
role in the disqualification equation.
The point here is not to identify the precise nature of the information included
in the dataset or to assign weights to factors incorporated into a disqualification
algorithm. The point is that using analytics to determine whether the average person
might reasonably question a judge’s impartiality facilitates consistent, uniform, and
objective disqualification decisions, something that has eluded the legal system
since the origin of appearance-based disqualification in 1972. The impact of
Fourteenth Court of Appeals, eight seats on Dallas’ all-Republican Fifth Court of Appeals,
four seats on Austin’s all-Republican Third Courts of Appeals and four seats on San
Antonio’s Fourth Court of Appeals.”). See generally Albert J. Klumpp, Judicial Primary
Elections in Cook County, Illinois: Fear the Irish Women!, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 821 (2011)
(discussing the effect of political party slating, endorsements from newspapers and bar
associations, ballot cues, and money on judicial election success).
200
Most Americans Want State Judges to be Elected, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Oct. 20,
2008),
https://theharrispoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Harris-Interactive-PollResearch-Electing-judges-2008-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ8M-RAEE].
201
Editorial, Mixed Signals: People Want to Elect Judges but Don’t Know Them,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at 2C.
202
See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“Even if judges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the mere
possibility that judges’ decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign
contributors is likely to undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary.”); see also
20/20 INSIGHT, NATIONAL REGISTERED VOTERS FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 2–4 (2011),
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NPJE2011poll_7FE4917006019.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/8YF6-WJ2Z] (finding that 83% of respondents believed that campaign contributions
have a “great deal” or “some” effect on a judge’s decision); GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER
RESEARCH & AMERICAN VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4
(2001), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-polls-justice-stake [https://perma.
cc/C5TR-XD25] (reporting result of national public opinion survey that 76% of registered
voters believe that campaign contributions have “a great deal” or “some” influence on
judicial decisions).
203
For example, based on the comments to Rule 60.04(7) of the Wisconsin Code of
Judicial Conduct, Wisconsin may choose to give more weight the public’s desire for an
elected judiciary than the public’s fear that contributions taint judicial decisions. See WIS.
SUP. CT. R. 60.04(7) (2019).
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campaign contributions on public trust in the judiciary, together with the volume of
pertinent public information, coalesce to produce a perfect platform for an
experiment with a big data-based disqualification process. The use of big data to
evaluate other circumstances that often form the basis of claims that a judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including friendships and other
relationships with litigants, lawyers, and witnesses, could be subsequently
addressed.
CONCLUSION
The appearance-based disqualification regime established in the 1972 ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct and subsequently adopted by every federal and state
jurisdiction is “crumbling.”204 The demise is not surprising. The ABA hoped to
increase the reliability of disqualification decisions by instituting an objective test
that empowered the fully informed, reasonable, layperson to decide whether the
circumstances created the perception that a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably
be questioned.” The 1972 ABA recusal test suffered from vagueness, the fiction that
the average person was fully informed of the legal and factual minutia necessary to
the disqualification decision, and the unrealistic assumption that the challenged
judge could serve as both the object and interpreter of the appearance standard.
These inherent defects prevent appearance-based recusal from achieving the ABA’s
goals. If anything, the standard established in the 1972 Code made disqualification
decisions less predictable and more arbitrary.205
The band-aid approaches to fixing appearance-based disqualification—
including requiring written recusal decisions and assigning disqualification motions
to independent judges—have failed because they do not address the underlying
flaws of the doctrine. The preemptory removal of one trial judge at the request of a
party might help solve part of the problem if automatic disqualification replaced the
“might reasonably be questioned” standard. But the nineteen states permitting
preemptory disqualification of trial judges have retained the “might reasonably be
questioned” test, requiring judges to apply the impossible standard when
independently evaluating their ethical obligations and when ruling on
disqualification motions. Other reforms that directly address the shortcomings of
appearance-based disqualification, such as empaneling a jury of “outsiders” to
decide whether the circumstances create a perception of partiality, have not received
serious consideration.
Big data cures the major deficiencies plaguing appearance-based
disqualification. Big data makes the fully informed, reasonable person a reality
rather than an embarrassing fiction. It also adds a measure of objectivity to the
204
Geyh, supra note 16, at 675 (“I argue that the dominant regime that has structured
judicial disqualification in the state and federal courts for nearly forty years . . . is crumbling,
and the struggle for a successor regime has begun.”).
205
See McKoski, supra note 18, at 433 (“The appearance-based disqualification scheme
adopted by the ABA, Congress, and the states has failed on every level.”).
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disqualification decision by replacing the challenged judge as the decision-maker or,
alternatively, by supplying the challenged judge with an objective assessment of the
circumstances. Best of all, the danger of erroneous decisions is absent when big data
is used in disqualification decisions because a judge does not engage big data
analytics unless the judge first determines that disqualification is not required. If big
data analytics confirms the judge’s conclusion, the judge remains on the case.
Assuming the big data decision is wrong, the parties suffer no change of position
because even without analytics, the case would have stayed with the judge. On the
other hand, if analytics disagrees with the judge and concludes that a reasonable
question exists as to the judge’s impartiality, a new judge is assigned. Even if the
big data analysis is wrong in determining that a new judge is necessary, the parties
suffer no adverse consequences because a presumption of impartiality attaches to
the successor judge. And, most importantly, in a disqualification regime controlled
by appearances, the algorithmic-based outcome will appear objective to the public
because it will be made by a truly fully informed outsider free from the judge’s
biases and preconceptions.

